Swinburne's argument for property dualism
Swinburne defends substance dualism, the claim that we are pure mental substances, ones that have only pure mental properties essentially. Pure mental properties are properties whose instantiation does not entail the instantiation of any physical properties. The property of seeing a desk is an impure mental property on Swinburne's view since necessarily someone can see a desk only if he or she is causally affected by one, and being causally affected by a desk is a physical property. Seeming to see a desk, however, entails no such condition; I can seem to see a desk even if there is no desk causally affecting me. A property P is mental, according to Swinburne, exactly if a substance S which instantiates P necessarily has privileged access to P's instantiation. If P is mental, then S can in principle know that he or she instantiates P in the same ways other substances know it, but there will be an additional way that S knows that P is instantiated, namely by experiencing it.
Properties that are not mental are either physical or neutral. Physical properties are ones to which 2 necessarily a substance does not have privileged access, and neutral properties are ones to which some substances have privileged access but others don't (disjunctive properties such as the property of being in pain or weighing 50kg are examples; both I and the desk instantiate this property, but I have privileged access to its instantiation and the desk does not).
Swinburne argues that mental and physical properties are distinct. This follows a priori, he says, from his definitions of 'mental' and 'physical' in conjunction with his account of properties.
Properties, according to Swinburne, are universals, and they are abundant: any predicate whatsoever, it seems, picks out a property, and two properties are identical exactly if their informative designators are logically equivalent (this is no slip of the tongue: Swinburne is quite serious about stating conditions under which two substances, or two properties, or two events are the same, and by this he appears to mean numerically the same; although he does not endeavor to explain how two things can be one). An informative designator of some substance, property, or event, X, is a rigid designator of X that expresses X's nature or essence, the conditions metaphysically necessary and sufficient for X being what it is. If 'red' is an informative designator, then the criteria for correctly applying it include the conditions that are metaphysically necessary and sufficient for being red. If those criteria are not logically equivalent to the criteria for correctly applying, say, 'reflects such-andsuch wavelengths of light', then being red and reflecting such-and-such wavelengths of light must be different properties. This is in fact the case, says Swinburne, for knowing that something reflects such-and-such wavelengths of light does not entail that it looks a certain way to most people. The latter is an additional fact about an object that goes beyond its reflecting such-and-such wavelengths of light. It is thus true a priori that red is not identical to reflecting such-and-such wavelengths of light. It is also true a priori that redness does not supervene on reflecting such-and-such wavelengths of light, for it is logically possible that objects which reflect such-and-such wavelengths of light might look differently to us. What is true of red, according to Swinburne, is also true of mental 3 properties; they are neither identical to nor supervenient upon physical properties. The criteria for correctly applying mental predicates and terms are not logically equivalent to the criteria for correctly applying physical ones; knowing that the former apply does not entail knowing that the latter apply and vice versa. Consequently, mental predicates and terms must designate properties distinct from those designated by physical predicates and terms.
The crucial premise in Swinburne's argument is that terms like 'red' and 'pain' are cannot be wrong about something looking red to me, I can still be wrong about something being red.
One way of developing this idea is to say that terms like 'red' get their meanings from certain prototypical applications. We apply 'red' to objects whose surfaces reflect such-and-such wavelengths of light to the eyes of such-and-such observers under such-and-such conditions (Swinburne countenances some of these conditions with the expression 'favorably positioned with faculties in working order and not subject to illusion'). Things get called 'red' to the extent that they resemble the prototypes. Sometimes, however, we find ourselves in circumstances that do not satisfy the conditions that define the prototypes; objects look red to us that are not "really" red; that is, that we would not call red if we saw them in prototypical circumstances (I see your tie in unusual lighting, and believe it is red, but recognize my mistake when we enter white light). If 'red' means something like this, then it is possible that redness might be identical to a surface property whose essence we do not know even though we can competently use 'red' to refer to objects having it.
Likewise, redness could be a higher-order property such as the property of having a surface property that reflects such-and-such wavelengths of light in prototypical circumstances. In either case, Swinburne's property dualism does not follow.
I confess that I found it difficult to discern an argument in Mind, Brain, and Free Will that would rule out views of this sort. Two considerations that Swinburne advances seem to fall short.
One is the point mentioned earlier that how something looks to people appears to be an extra fact about it beyond its having a certain reflectance spectrum. Exponents of the Kripke-Putnam view can readily concede this point. When we are talking about how things look to us, they can say, we are talking about a relation between a surface and an observer as opposed to a property of the surface taken by itself. Since relations are not intrinsic properties, facts about relations are not facts about intrinsic properties. It does not follow from this, however, that redness is not an intrinsic physical property, nor that it is not a physical relation.
Second, Swinburne appeals to the kind of argument J. J. C. Smart attributed to Max Black. 1 If 'red' and 'reflecting such-and-such wavelengths of light' are not logically equivalent, as exponents of the Kripke-Putnam account must concede, then the criteria for correctly applying the one term cannot be identical to the criteria for correctly applying the other. The differences between these criteria must ultimately boil down to differences among properties. There must be certain properties whose recognition by a competent speaker underwrites the correct use of 'red', and certain properties whose recognition by a competent speaker underwrites the correct use of 'reflecting suchand-such wavelengths of light'. These properties, moreover, must be different, for it must be possible for competent speakers to recognize the instantiation of the properties that sanction the use of the one term while at the same time not recognizing the instantiation of the properties that sanction the use of the other. Consequently, it looks as though exponents of the Kripke-Putnam account must endorse a dualism of properties.
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The problem with this argument is that by itself it does not support the dualism of physical and nonphysical properties that Swinburne looks to defend; it supports only the thesis that the properties which underwrite the correct use of 'red' must be different from those which underwrite the correct use of 'reflecting such-and-such wavelengths of light', and it does not follow from this alone that the former properties must be nonphysical and the latter physical. To appreciate this let us imagine for the sake of argument that physicalism is true, and that P 1 , P 2 ,…, P n are all the properties that exist. Since physicalism is true by assumption, P 1 , P 2 ,…, P n are all physical properties.
Suppose now that competent speakers apply the predicate 'is red' to something if and only if it instantiates P 1 , and that they apply the predicate 'reflects such-and-such wavelengths of light' to something if and only if it instantiates P 2 . In that case, the properties that competent speakers must recognize to correctly apply the one predicate differ from the properties they must recognize to correctly apply the other, yet it does not follow that either predicate expresses a nonphysical property, for by assumption all properties are physical. The dualism that the argument supports is merely a dualism of conditions for correctly applying predicates or terms-a difference in what some philosophers call 'modes of presentation'. 2 This does not by itself support a dualism of physical and nonphysical properties. To derive that conclusion a further premise is needed to the effect that the properties which fix the referents of terms like 'red' must be nonphysical. But it is difficult to see how exponents of the argument can endorse such a premise without either begging the question against their opponents or making tendentious assumptions about properties. and 'pain' are informative designators in Swinburne's sense, and as a result it remains unclear why we should accept the property dualism Swinburne endorses. conception of ourselves without thought, so Descartes concluded that we could not exist without it, and since this was the only property of which this was true, it must be our only essential property.
Arnauld's worry about Descartes' argument was that the initial conception people had of themselves might be in some way impoverished, that people might have properties, perhaps even essential ones, of which they were entirely ignorant, and which therefore did not appear on Descartes' list. Since these properties would not have been subjected to Descartes' conceivability test, Descartes' conclusion would not follow; we could have essential properties of which we are entirely unaware.
Descartes conceded to Arnauld that the conception we started with would have to comprise all our essential properties (it would have to be 'complete' as he put it), but he never explained why we should suppose that the conception we have of ourselves is complete in fact.
What was true of Descartes vis-à-vis Arnauld seems true of Swinburne vis-à-vis Kripke and
Putnam. Kripke and Putnam made it evident that Arnauld's worry was not an abstract possibility; rather, our best concrete efforts at understanding the world have revealed that things often have 9 properties, including essential ones, of which we can remain entirely unaware in our pedestrian dealings, and which for that reason do not factor into the meanings of the terms we use to refer to them. Just as it is unclear how Swinburne rules out a Kripke-Putnam account when it comes to properties like redness, it is unclear how he rules it out when it comes to substances like you and I.
He implies knowing what I essentially am, and as a result it remains unclear how we ought to arrive at the conclusion that we are pure mental substances, ones that have only pure mental properties essentially.
The work of Arnauld, Kripke, and Putnam points to a general worry that has confronted
Cartesian projects like Swinburne's since the seventeenth century. The arguments Cartesians advance typically assume that our concepts and the predicates and terms that express them leave out nothing essential to the things we think and talk about, that they are 'complete' in Descartes' sense, and as a result we can know how matters stand with regard to ourselves, our bodies, our powers, properties, and so on, merely by consulting our language and concepts. It is this assumption that Swinburne encapsulates in his claim that 'red', 'pain', 'I', and other terms are informative designators, and that I've suggested he has failed adequately to defend.
The foregoing remarks criticize the idea that mental properties are our only essential
properties, but are mental properties essential to us at all? I confess that I found Swinburne's argument for this claim rather difficult to follow. Its main premises appear to be these:
(1) If humans coexperience conscious mental events of different kinds (if, for instance, they simultaneously see the trees outside and smell the coffee brewing), then mental properties determine the physical boundaries of a substance. remains unclear why we should accept premise (3) , and hence why we should accept that we have mental properties essentially.
Physical phenomena and structure
A final point concerns Swinburne's notion of bodies and physical phenomena generally. A substance is mental according to Swinburne if it has mental properties essentially, and it is physical otherwise. This might strike some readers as a rather odd way of defining 'physical', for suppose that I am a ghostly being made of ectoplasm with properties that physics cannot even in principle describe, and that I have mental properties but only contingently (when, say, the ectoplasm achieves According to Bechtel, a complex whole-what he calls a 'mechanism'-such as an organism, has an organization that confers on it capacities that are not had by its parts taken in isolation, and that cannot be reductively explained in terms of lower-level sciences. His work and that of others suggest that our best empirical descriptions and explanations of living behavior posit organization (or structure, arrangement, order, configuration) as a basic ontological and explanatory principle.
Swinburne concedes that wholes are composed of parts arranged a certain way, and that parts sometimes behave differently when incorporated into larger wholes. "Nevertheless," he says, "the causal properties of larger substances such as organisms are just the causal properties of their parts…" (p. 32). For Swinburne, arrangement makes no causal difference to things. It might be an ontological principle insofar as it is in part what makes a whole what it is, but it is not an explanatory principle on Swinburne's view since it does not confer any powers on a whole beyond those conferred by its parts. Swinburne is not alone in thinking this. His position is the norm among Cartesians and also among physicalists. Yet if the hylomorphic alternative just described is viable, it could relieve some of the anxieties that motivate both substance dualism and physicalism, for it implies an antireductionism that preserves what is special about human existence without denying humans' essential materiality. 5 Distinctively human traits, it says, are due to our distinctively human structures, structures that are nevertheless essentially embodied in physical materials. And since structures are basic ontological and explanatory principles on the hylomorphic view, ones that confer powers on a thing beyond those conferred by its composing materials, the view is robustly antireductive. Seen by comparison with a view like this, the project of trying to preserve human distinctiveness by denying essential human materiality begins to lose some of its appeal.
There is clearly a great deal more to be said on this point and on Mind, Brain, and Free Will in general, but I hope what I've said is enough to contribute in a small way to a further discussion of Swinburne's work.
